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ABSTRACT
In the last two decades, Medicare spending has doubled in real terms despite the fact that the health
of Medicare beneficiaries improved over this period.  The goals of this paper are to document how trends
in spending by age have changed among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in the last decade and to reconcile
the decline in disability rates with rapid increases in spending among the elderly.  First, we conclude that
the trend of disproportionate spending growth among the oldest old has continued between 1985 and
1995.  Spending among the younger elderly, those 65-69 rose by two percent annually in real per person
terms.  In contrast, spending for those over age 85 rose by four percent.  Second we show that the reasons
for the large increase in spending on the oldest elderly relative to the younger elderly is the rapid increase
in the use of post-acute services such as home health care and skilled nursing care.  Spending on post-acute
care for the very old has risen 20 percent per year in the last decade.
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Health care for the elderly in America is at the center ofpublic debate. In the last two
decades, the number of Medicare beneficiaries has increased by 50percent, and Medicare
spending per beneficiary has doubled in real terms.' Although rapid growth in medicalspending
affects all age groups, Cutler and Meara (1998) document thatspending growth occurred most
rapidly among the elderly from the 1950s through the 1980s, and within thepopulation over 65,
spending grew fastest among the oldest old.2
These findings are difficult to understand, however, inlight of changes in the health of
the elderly. Manton and co-authors show that disabilityrates are falling among the elderly by
about 1.5 percent per year (Manton et al. 1997). Since the disabledspend much more than the
non-disabled on medical care, it seems that in relative, if not absoluteterms, spending on the
elderly should be falling over time.
The combination of large increases inper person spending and the reduction in disability
leads to the paradoxical situation where policy analysts callsimultaneously for reforms to control
Medicare cost growth (to bring spending growth for theelderly in line with other age groups) and
for Medicare to cover currently uncovered services suchas prescription drugs (to promote further
health improvements).
The goals of this paper are to document how trends inspending by age have changed
among elderly Medicare beneficiaries in the last decade and to reconcile the decline in disability
'Based on total Medicare expenditures and total enrolleesin 1975 and 1995. Sec 1Ieahh
United States 1998, p. 367.
2 Relativespending by age group was fairly flat in 1953. By 1987, spendingon the
average 85 year old was over 5 times as high as spending on those aged 35-44.rates with rapid increases in spending among the elderly. The firstgoal follows from our earlier
paper (Cutler and Meara, 1998) where we analyzed medical spending byage from the mid-1950s
through 1987. Since the medical world changed dramatically after 1987,we consider what has
happened to age-specific spending since then. In the post-1987 period,we cannot look at
spending for the elderly in comparison to the non-elderly, but we can look atspending for the
younger and older elderly. The second goal is an attempt to reconcile increased spending with
sharply declining disability. In particular, we relate medical spending byage to six factors:
demographics, disability, time until death, intensity of treatment, prices, andchanges in the
nature of care.
We reach two central conclusions. First, we find that the trend ofdisproportionate
spending growth among the oldest old has continued during the decade between 1985 and 1995.
Between 1985 and 1995, spending for theyounger elderly (ages 65-69) rose by 2 percent
annually in real, per person terms, while spending for the older elderly (ages85+) rose by 4
percent. This is similar to the differential increase in spending byage over the 1953-1987 period.
Second, we show that the reason for the large increase in spendingon the oldest elderly in
comparison to the younger elderly is the rapid increase in use ofpost-acute services among the
oldest old --homehealth care and skilled nursing care in particular.People 85 and older used on
average $241 in post-acute services in 1985 and $1,887 in 1995, a 20 percent annual increase.
The younger elderly, in contrast, increased their use ofpost-acute services from $49 to $257, a 15
percent annual increase. Use of acute care services, in contrast,grew relatively evenly by age.
1 .2 percent annually for the younger elderly and 0.7percent annually for the older elderly.
The increase in post-acute service use is the explanation for thediscrepancy between
2rising medical spending and falling disability. Lower disability by itself contributes to lower
spending than we would otherwise observe. But the increase in use of non-traditional services
more than offsets the effects of improved health. The increase in post-acute service use is also a
major difference between the pre- and post-1987 trends. In our earlier work (Cutler and Meara,
1998), we found that rising expenditures on the older population were a result of increased
intensity of acute care services for that age group. In the post-1987 period, intensity changes in
acute care treatments do not account for a substantial discrepancy by age.
The increase in post-acute service use may reflect several factors: true increased service
use for people who were not receiving care in the past; "gaming" of the Medicare system, where
providers now use out-of-hospital services instead of in-hospital services; or outright fraud. We
are unable to discriminate among these explanations, although we suspect each is important.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe our data. Section 3 starts the
analysis by comparing past and current trends in medical spending by age. Section 4 analyzes
how changes in demographics, disability, and death contribute to spendingover time. Section 5
examinesacute care spending. Section 6 examines post-acute care spending, and 7 concludes.
2.Data
TheNational Long-term Care Surveys (NLTCS) were conducted in 1982, 84, 89, and 94
to determine the prevalence of disability among the Medicare population. A sample of about
35,000 individuals was drawn from Medicare administrative records and surveyed in 1982. In
addition to standard demographic information, thesurvey collected detailed information on each
3individual's instrumental activities of daily living (JADLs, such asmanaging money, keeping
house, etc.) and activities of daily living (ADLs, such as dressing, bathing, etc.). Insubsequent
surveys, a sub-sample of those initially interviewed were re-screened to determine disability
status and additional individuals "aged" into the NLTCS. In total, the NLTCSpublic use data set
provides information on 35,848 individuals. The survey data for these individuals has been
linked to all Medicare claims data from 1982 through 1995.
We use the National Long-Term Care Survey fromyears 1984, 1989, and 1994, matched
to Medicare records for 1984-85, 1989-90, and j994953 We pooled the Medicare data intwo-
year increments to increase the precision of our estimates.4 All numbers reported in the tables are
in 1995 dollars adjusted using the CPI-U deflator.
One drawback of the NLTCS for our purpose is that we have no link to othertypes of
medical spending beyond Medicare. Approximately one third of Medicaid'sbudget pays for
nursing home services for elderly recipients. Because such services are disproportionately
skewed towards the older elderly population, however, wesuspect the omission of Medicaid-
covered long-term care understates the growth in spending by the oldest old.Further, non-
hospital prescription drugs are not paid for by Medicare, and are thus unrecorded in thesurvey.
We do not know how the omission of this category of care affectsour results.
All calculations use the Center for Demographic Studies "screener cross-sectional
weights" to make tabulations representative of the Medicare population in thoseyears.
4We inflated expenditure data from 1984, 1989, and1994by the one year nominal growth
rate in per capita expenditures from 1984-85, 1989-90, and 1994-95respectively.
43. Past and Current Trends in Medical Spending by Age
During the period from the 1 950s through the 1 980s, the distribution of medical spending
changed dramatically in the U.S. Figure 1 and table 1 reproduce the trend in medical spending
documented in Cutler and Meara (1998). The figure showsper capita medical spending relative
to per capita spending for 35-44 year olds. In 1953 spending was fairly constant acrossage
groups. Middle aged and elderly individuals spent the same amount on medical care. From the
1950s to the 1980s, medical spending grew dramatically within allage groups, but by 1987, the
oldest old (85+) were spending over five times as much as the 35-44age group.
Figures 2(a) and (b) examine this trend for the NLTCS data between 1985 and 1995 for
the population over 65. Over the last decade, spendingamong the youngest Medicare
beneficiaries, those aged 65-69, grew by 2.0 percent annually, from 2,062 to $2,519. Among
older age groups, and particularly those over 85, per person spendinggrew at a staggering rate
between 1990 and 1995. While the oldest old spent $3,730 in 1985, they werespending $5,709
by 1995, a 4.3 percent annual increase.
To see this trend another way, figure 2(b) normalizes spending in eachage group and year
relative to spending by those aged 65-69 in that year. In 1985, the oldest oldwere spending
about 80 percent more than this reference group. By 1995, the oldest old werespending over
twice as much per year as 65-69 year olds.
The trend towards greater spending increases withage is generally true for most o the
age groups, with the exception of the 75-79 year old population. These findings represent a
continuation of the trend documented from the early 1 960s to the I 980s -medicalspemiding is
5growing rapidly for all elderly, but particularly among the oldest age groups.
4. Demographics, disability and time until death
An important component of changes in medical spending is changes in disability status.
Two measures of disability have been highlighted in the literature (see Cutler and Sheiner, 1998):
functional status; and time until death. Functional status is typically measured with ADL or
IADL impairments. People who are functionally impaired spend more on medical care than
those who are not impaired. Research also shows that those near death spend much more on
medical care than those further away from death (Lubitz and Riley, 1993). About one-third of
Medicare spending is in the last year of life.
Table 2 examines how the pattern of age, disability, and death rates influence medical
spending. The table shows four models of annual individual Medicare spending in 1989 ind
1990. In other words, each observation represents a person-year of spending. Table 2 shows
individual spending as a function of basic demographics (age, sex, race and marital status),
disability status, and time until death. Column (I) relates Medicare spending to age, sex, race,
and marital status alone (the coefficients on race and marital status are not reported). Consistent
with earlier work, Medicare spending is highest for the oldest old. Those over 85 spend almost
$2,000 more than those under 70. Women spend $700 less than men onaverage; this is also true
holding constant functional status and time until death.
Column (2) adds measures of functional status to the regression. the differences in
spending by age are much less dramatic when we control for disability status in column (2).
6Only those age 75-84spendmore than 65-69yearolds. Essentially all of the additional spending
of those aged 85 and older is a result of greater disability.
Column (3) replaces the disability variables with measures of time until death. We
include dummies for the quarter of death for those individuals who dies in a given year. The
result is similar in column (3) when we control instead for time until death. Time until death
also explains a large part of the age effect. Advanced age is associated with only half as big a
change when controlling for time until death.
Column (4) includes both functional status and time until death in the regression.
Disability and time until death appear to have independent effects on Medicare spending. And
together, these two variables explain essentially all of the age effect. The results in table 2
confirm those found in Cutler and Sheiner (1998) using the Medicare Current Beneficiary
Survey. Age in itself is not associated with increased levels of Medicare spending; it is the
decline in health status associated with advanced ages and the period near death that leads to
higher levels of medical spending.
As mortality rates among the elderly decline, fewer people are in the last year of life.
Further, disability among the elderly is falling. Table 3, for example, shows rates of
hospitalization for conimon illnesses. Overall hospitalization rates fell from 30to22 percent in
the decade studied. There were declines in rates of hospitalization for virtually all diseases
shown.
Table 4 shows rates of disability and mortality between I 94 and 1995. Overall disability
rates fell by about one to two percentage points for those aged 6579.But,for those over age 80,
rates of disability fell dramatically, by about 7 percentage points. Rates of severe disability were
7much more constant over this period, falling only slightly. The declines were greater, though, at
older ages. These trends are striking in light of the pattern of declining mortality. The share of
people who will die in a given year has declined within all age groups over 65.Asothers have
suggested (Manton, 1997), not only are Americans living longer, but they are living with fewer
diseases and functional limitations.
The combination of longer life and reduced disability suggests that medical spending for
the elderly should be falling, particularly at advanced ages. In table 4 and figure 3, we combine
changes in disability and death rates with our estimates of how disability and death impact
medical spending to simulate how spending would have changed based solely on changes in
disability and death rates. We use the regression coefficients from model 4 in table 1 (excluding
race and marital status) to do this prediction.5 Predicted spending falls slightly, from $3,324 to
$3,212 over the decade shown in table 4. And the decline is somewhat greater for the older
elderly than for the younger elderly (figure 3).
It is apparent that figure 3 and figure 2(b) are in conflict. The changes in disability and
death predict that relative spending for the oldest age groups should fall compared with those age
65-69,orat worst stay the same. In fact, medical spending increased twice as rapidly for the
oldest elderly in comparison to the younger elderly.
The remainder of the paper aims to explain why spending by age is increasing when the
underlying health of the population is improving.
Our estimates hold constant the 1989-90 age and sex distribution.
85. Acute Care Spending
To examine why age patterns in spending have changed, we divide medical spending into
two parts: acute care spending and post-acute care spending. Acute care is defined as spending
for in-patient and out-patient care in general hospitals and physician offices. Post-acute care
spending includes spending on skilled nursing facilities, hospice care, home health, and
comprehensive out-patient rehabilitation facilities. This distinction is imperfect. Some
rehabilitative care may show up in our measures of acute care spending, since the Medicare
claims data do not allow one to perfectly distinguish rehabilitative care from acute care. But the
distinction is generally a meaningful one.
The vast majority of spending on acute care is for inpatient hospital care. Inpatient care is
reimbursed prospectively based on one of over 400 diagnosis-related groups (DRGs). Each
patient is assigned a DRG based on the predominant diagnosis of admission. DRGs are then
given relative weights in accordance with the intensity of treatment typically provided for that
diagnosis. Payments are formed as the product of the DRG weight and a price:
Reimbursement =DRGweight *Price. (1)
Over time either weights or price may change. For example, weights for surgical DRGs
are generally higher than for medical DRGs, SO as more people receive surgery over time, the
average DRG weight will increase (Cutler and McClellan, 1998). Changes in intensity of
treatment have historically been significant. Cutler and Meara (1998) document that changes in
9technology for treatment of major illnesses such as cancers and heart disease coincide with large
increases in spending for the elderly.
Medicare also updates the price paid for services over time. The increase in the update
factor was designed to keep pace with the growth of input costs for hospitals, although actual
update factors have increased less rapidly, as a response to other changes in the health system
(Cutler, 1998).
We examine the intensity of treatment by focusing on major diseases of old age where
hospital admission is a good indicator of illness. The diseases include: acute myocardial
infarctions (heart attacks), other ischemic heart disease, congestive heart failure, stroke and other
acute cerebrovascular diseases, cancer, emphysema, chronic obstructive pulmonary disorder, hip
fractures, other fractures, depression, schizophrenia, and Alzheimer's. For each individual we
construct an intensity measure equal to the sum of DRG weights for all hospital visits in a year.
Table 6 shows the average intensity measure across respondents, and for respondents with
each of the diseases listed above. The average intensity measure per Medicare beneficiary has
actually declined over time, as hospitalization rates have fallen. Conditional on being admitted
to the hospital, however the intensity of treatment has risen over time by about 2 1 percent.
Intensity is rising over time even within a diagnosis. To examine three well-defined acute
diagnoses, we constructed several 90-day intensity measures. We summed all DRG weights for
services provided within 90 days of an admission for AMI, stroke, or hip fracture. The last three
columns of table 6 demonstrate that the intensity of services for these three diagnoses has risen in
the last decade. The rise in intensity of services overall implies about a $1,000 increase in
spending. However, the rise in intensity cannot explain the roughly $5,000 per person increase in
1 0spending for individuals who were hospitalized in a year.
The other component in equation (1) that could lead to increased medical spending is the
price paid for medical services. As noted above, however, the update factor has not increased
rapidly. Indeed, in real terms between 1985 and 1994, the update factor fell by 7 percent. These
cuts in the update factor were a response to gaming in the prospective payment system.
Immediately following the implementation of prospective payment in 1982, the average
diagnosis became much more serious relative to before prospective payment. The increase in
serious diagnoses or "diagnosis creep" reflected provider attempts to increase payment.
Medicare officials responded by cutting the increase in the update factor. Further cuts in the
update factor were a component of deficit reduction legislation in 1990 and 1993. Price
increases, therefore play no role in the rise of Medicare spending.
The net effect on acute care spending is reflected in figures 4a and 4h. Acute care
spending rose slightly in all age groups, but the rise was smaller among the older elderly than
among the younger elderly. Among the 65-69 age group, spending rose from $2,000 to about
$2,300, a 1 .2 percent annual increase (table I). Elderly over age 85 witnessed a 0.7 percent
annual increase, from $3,500 to $3,700. Relative spending on acute care actually fell modestly
for the oldest age groups.
Taken together the information on acute care spending suggests that increases in the
intensity of treatment offset disability changes slightly, but changes in prices do not. The overall
annual change in medical spending for the elderly explained by increased useofacute care
services is only 1 percent (compared to an 3 percent average increase for the elderly population,
and the increase is greater for the younger elderly than for the older elderly. Other explanations
IIare clearly more important in explaining the growth in medical costs for the elderly population as
a whole, and particularly for the oldest elderly.
6. Post-acute care spending
To complete the picture of changing Medicare spending, we examine the fastest growing
portion of Medicare costs, post-acute care services. As noted above, post-acute care spending
includes home health, hospice care, comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation care, and skilled
nursing care.
Figures 5(a) and (b) demonstrate the striking growth in real spending on these services.
Growth in real, per person post-acute services ranged from 15 percent per year for the youngest
elderly to 21 percent per year for the oldest elderly (table 1). The numbers are staggering. In
1995, the oldest elderly averaged nearly $2,000 per person on post-acute services, up from $240
in 1985. As displayed in figure Sb this contributes significantly to higher relative spending
among the over 85 population. Relative post-acute spending for the oldest elderly compared to
the younger elderly rose from a factor of 5 to a factor of over 8.
To understand what these services involve, consider the canonical case of an elderly
person with a stroke or hip fracture. Such a person needs some acute care services (for example,
a hip replacement) and then a period of recovery, involving physical and occupational therapy
and perhaps help with routine services the person is not able to perform on their own.
Table 6 shows the steady rise in average annual post-acute care spending for individuals
admitted to the hospital with a hip fracture or stroke. Hip fracture patients spent about $ 1 ,600 in
121984-85. But by 1994-95, they spent $5,200, an increase of over 200 percent. Cost increases
were similar for people with a stroke. What is interesting about these conditions is that by most
measures, people with a hip fracture or stroke are getting healthier over time (Cutler and
Richardson,1997). Thus, the increase in post-acute service use is unlikely to be just a response to
sicker elderly.
Increases in post-acute service use might reflect one of three factors. The first is
"gaming", or changes in the site of care. Care that follows an injury such as hip fracture provides
a good example of this. Inpatient care is reimbursed prospectively, so hospitals receive the same
payment regardless of whether they provide rehabilitative care in the inpatient setting or not.
Post-acute care is reimbursed on a cost basis, however, when services are used. Thus, if
hospitals "unbundle" the post-acute care from the inpatient setting, they can collect additional
revenues at no extra cost.
In some cases, this unbundling occurs in the hospital itself. Hospitals can set up a wing
for rehabilitation or skilled nursing facility care. Using these services many simply involve
wheeling the hip fracture patient down the halt, delivering the same services as formerly, and
collecting higher reimbursement. In other cases, the home health agency or skilled nursing
facility will be a separate provider. This increase in spending may be associated with a reduction
in costs. Outpatient settings are generally cheaper than inpatient settings, so that total costs may
fall even as reimbursement is rising.
A second explanation is that increased post-acute spending reflects additional use of
services. The rules on when the elderly could use post-acute services were relaxed substantially
in the late I 980s, just before the explosion in service use. At least some of the additional service
13use may be a result of people having access to services they went without previously, or had a
family member provide informally.
The final explanation is that increased post-acute service use represents fraud in the
program. Since post-acute services are provided in a person's house, by small agencies that are
not easily monitored, the potential for fraud is vast. Recent congressional testimony highlighted
frequent instances of fraud in the home health program. The testimony cited one estimate
suggesting that as many 40 percent of home health claims should have been denied.6 This
number is sobering given that home health has risen from one percent of Medicare spending in
1970 to over 13 percent in 1995.
We have no way to differentiate among these theories with our data, since the inpatient
data do not indicate completely what services are provided. Disentangling the alternative sources
of cost growth in post-acute care is a major research topic.
A related topic is the health consequences are of shifting health care delivery towards
more post-acute care settings. It may be socially beneficial, if costly, for people to receive care
out of a hospital setting. Post-acute providers may have more skill in their jobs than nurses in an
inpatient setting have. Patients also like more being at home rather than in a hospital. This too is
an important topic for future research.
6See HCFA's website, http://www.hcfa.gov/testmony/ 1998/9803 1 8.htm.
147. Conclusion
Over the last decade, medical spending for the oldest old has continued to increase more
rapidly than for the youngest old. However, unlike the spending growth in the early 1980s, this
growth has little to do with increased intensity of treatment. Over the 1990s, much of the
spending growth relates to increased use of post-acute care services. Some of the increased
spending on post-acute care likely reflects gaming of Medicare through practices such as
unbundling care to maximize reimbursement, some reflects increased service use, and some may
be outright fraud.
Our results have not addressed the question of what this increased medical spending is
buying. This question is central in evaluating the growth of medical costs for the elderly and
non-elderly population. Medical spending is valuable if it purchases services worth more than
their cost and problematic if the services are worth less than their cost. Additional research on
the importance of Medicare in improved health would complement the findings here about the
sources of Medicare cost increases.
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Figure 1: The Age Distribution of Medical Spending
1953-1987







1953 age groups nclude: 0-56-1718-24,25-3435-54,55-64 & 65+. Relative spending for 5-24 year olds was constructed assuming
a uniform age distnbution. Dashed lines in 1953 connect all age groups which were combined when calculating relative spending.
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Fig. 4a: Medicare Acute Care Spending Per Person
1984-85 R— 1989-90 —-- 1994-95
Note: Mute care includes inpatient and outpatient Services delivered in general hospitals, doctors oltices, and other acute carf sites.
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AgeFig. 4b: Relative Acute Care Spending Per Person
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Fig. 5a: Post-Acute Care Spending
1984-85 —I— 1989-90 —— 1994-95
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Note: Post-Acute care Includes slclted nursing, home health, hospice care, and Comprehensive Outpatient Rehabilitation F4ilities.
Fig. 5b: Relative Post-Acute Care Spending
65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
AgeTable 1: Medical Spending by Age and Type of Care
65-69 70-74 75-79 80-84 85+
All medical spending (NMES)
1963 $1,102$1,178$1,417 $964 $819
1977 3,205 3,561 4,274 4,607 5,220
1987 3,726 4,063 4,170 5,607 5,650
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rate from the previous
National Long Term Care
year. NMES =National
Survey.Table 2: Explaining Medicare Reimbursement, 1989-90
Independent Variable (1) (2) (3) (4)
Demographics
Age 70-74 369 251 289 201
(151) (148) (149) (147)
Age 75-79 1203 897 970 744
(190) (190) (185) (187)
Age 80-84 1559 878 1154 646
(177) (183) (174) (187)
Age 85+ 1990 398 1120 -34
(197) (233) (201) (232)
Female -696 -777 -436 -526
(127) (125) (121) (119)
Disability











Diedinfirst quarter — 10,464 95 13
(725) (729)
Died in second quarter --- 7,242 6402
(954) (967)
Died in third quarter 10,97I 10,200
(1,910) (2896)
Diedin fourth quarter 12,460 I1,824
(1200) (1202)
R2 .0106 .0375 .0698 .0862
Note: There are 3 1,693 observations in each regression. Regressions include
controls for race and marital status. Dependent variable is individual annual
spending.Table 3: Changes in Disease Incidence
Age and sex adjusted rate
Condition 1984-851989-901994-95
All Hospitalization .306 .239 .218
Cardiovascular
Heart Attack .012 .010 .010
Stroke .006 .004 .003
Other ischemic heart disease .022 .021 .020
Congestive heart failure .017 .017 .016
Other cerebrovascular .019 .016 .016
Cancer .029 .021 .018
Respiratory-
COPD .008 .005 .009
Emphysema .0007 .0004 .0006
Kidney Failure .0020 .0015 .0018
Musculoskeletal
Hip fracture .010 .009 .009
Other fracture .0086 .0065 .0051
Mental Illness
Depression .0004 .0003 2.90e-05
Schizophrenia .00018 .000 14 .0004
Alzheimer's .0022 .001 8 .0018
N 42,986 32,294 33,786
Note: Disease rates are based on the 1990 age-sex distribution. An
individual is defined as having a condition when hospitalized with the












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 5:PredictedSpending Based on Disability and Death
Year Predicted Spending Ratio
1984-85 $3,324
1989-90 $3,333 1.00
1994-95 $3,212 0.97Table 6: Changes in Intensity of Treatment
Annual DRG weight for 90-day episode DRG weight
people admitted to hospital for people admitted to
for condition hospital for condition
Condition '84-'85'89-'90'94-'95 '84-'85'89-'90'94-'95
All respondents 0.5800.5420.507
All hospitalized respondents 1.89 2.25 2.29
Cardiovascular
Heart Attack 2.80 3.53 3.81 2.29 3.22 3.09
Stroke 2.56 3.59 3.07 2.25 1.82 2.33
Other ischemic heart disease 2.87 3.42 3.62
Congestive heart failure 2.99 3.14 3.34
Other cerebrovascular 2.17 2.50 2.40
Cancer 2.99 3.32 2.87
Respiratory
COPD 2.70 2.76 2.86
Musculoskeletal
Hip fracture 3.03 3.38 3.27 2.70 3.01 2.76
Other fracture 1.64 1.83 2.02
Alzheimer's 2.37 2.16 2.67
Kidney Failure 3.92 4.25 4.48
N (total) 30,01126,23728,292
N (hospitalized) 9,468 6,6636,713
Note: DRG weights are those prevailing in 1989.Table 7: Post-Acute Care Spending for Hip Fracture and Stroke Patients
Condition 1984-85 1989-90 1994-95
Hip Fracture $1,567 $3,207 $5,220
Stroke 1,488 3,151 4,311
Note: Post-Acute care includes skilled nursing, home health, hospice care, and
comprehensive outpatient rehabilitation facilities. Spending is average annual spending for
individuals admitted with hip fracture or stroke.